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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.

§77-35-26(b)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(h)

(1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a criminal action may take
an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment of conviction
of a first degree felony.

In this case final judgment and

conviction was rendered by the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge,
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

iii

TEXT OF STATUTE

Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides:
(a) General rule.

For the purpose of attacking the

credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.

iv

STATEMENT OP ISSUE

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in denying
Mr. Lanier's motion to suppress his prior convictions?

v
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Honorable
Richard H. Moffat, Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

A jury found Mr. Lanier guilty of Aggravated

Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-302 (1953 as amended) after a trial held on June 30 and July
1, 1987.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 20, 1986, at approximately 4:00 p.m., a man and woman
robbed the G.E.M. Music Store.

According to Gilbert Martinez, the

owner of the store, he was on the telephone and turned around to see
the male robber about fifteen feet away running towards him (R170,
183).

The man wore glasses and was holding a gun in his hand; he

had a beard and what appeared to Mr. Martinez to be a phony mustache
(R186-8).
The man pointed the gun at Mr. Martinez1 right cheek then
moved it to the back of Mr. Martinez1 head and forced him to lie
down in a room at the back of the store (R173, 189, 192). The man

took Mr. Martinez' wallet and some money from his back pockets, then
yelled "Are you ready?11 to a female in the front of the store, who
responded "yes" (R173-175).
Detective Horiuchi of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office
did the follow up investigation of the robbery (R245).

Detective

Horiuchi testified that during the initial investigation, another
officer who had questioned Mr. Martinez wrote in the report that the
hair color of the robber was unknown (R249).

However, Mr. Martinez

told Detective Horiuchi that he thought the suspect's hair was light
brown (R249).
When asked at trial how certain he was of his identification
of the defendant, Mr. Martinez claimed to be "positive" (R176).
However, prior to trial, when Detective Horiuchi showed Mr. Martinez
a photo spread comprised of six photographs, Mr. Martinez had been
ninety percent certain that one of the photographs showed the person
who committed the robbery (R255).

That photograph turned out to be

a Mr. Robert Larken, not the Appellant, Mr. Lanier (R255).
Two days after Mr. Martinez selected Mr. Larken from the photo
spread, Detective Horiuchi presented an additional photo spread to
Mr. Martinez (R258).

Mr. Martinez picked the appellant's photograph

from that spread (R258-60).
At trial, Debbie Alder testified that the robbery was her idea
(R217) and that Kimberly Nance and the Appellant were also involved
(R212).

Ms. Alder acknowledged that she had been allowed to plead

guilty to a charge of theft, a third degree felony as part of a plea
bargain for her role in the present case (R215-16).

She testified

that she participated in the robbery for money to support her drug
- 2 -

habit (R214).

She acknowledged that at the time she first

implicated Mr. Lanier, she knew he was out of State and that he was
"a rather convenient person to indicate [as being] involved in the
robbery because he was leaving the State11 (R246).
Kimberly Nance testified that she also was allowed to plead
guilty to theft, a third degree felony, as a result of her
involvement in the case (R222).

Ms. Nance testified that Ms. Alder

and another person were involved in the robbery (R223).

When asked

regarding the other participant, fl[d]o you see that person in the
court room today?", Ms. Nance stated, ff[n]ot to my knowledge" (R223).
During the recess following the first day of trial, counsel
for Mr. Lanier made a motion to exclude evidence of Mr. Lanier's
prior convictions in 1977 and 1978 for burglary and 1981 for robbery
(R231).

The court denied the motion (R242).

The jury returned from

deliberations with a guilty verdict on the charge of aggravated
robbery (R273).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Lanier's motion to
suppress his convictions for burglary and robbery pursuant to Rule
609, Utah Rules of Evidence.

The convictions were not crimes of

dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of subsection 2 of
Rule 609(a); furthermore, the probative value of the convictions did
not outweigh their prejudicial effect.

Such error was reversible

since it precluded Mr. Lanier from testifying as to his whereabouts
at the time of the robbery.

- 3 -

ARGUMENT
POINT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. LANIER'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS.
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a written motion to
suppress Mr. Lanier's prior convictions pursuant to Rule 609, Utah
Rules of Evidence, on the grounds "they are either more prejudicial
than probative, or they are not crimes of dishonesty or false
statement" (R65).

During a recess in the trial, immediately prior

to the State resting its case, the parties argued the motion
(R231-41).
Mr. Lanier's prior convictions which the State would have
attempted to use for impeachment purposes if he were to testify,
consisted of a 1977 conviction for second degree burglary, a 1978
conviction for second degree burglary1 and a 1981 conviction for
robbery (R232).

The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the

prior convictions were admissible under both subsections of Rule
609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)(R242).
As a result of the Judge's ruling, Mr. Lanier did not testify
in his defense.

The instant case was tried on June 30 and July 1,

1987, prior to this Court's decision in State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d
1032 (Utah 1987) and therefore is reviewable on appeal.

Id. at

1036.2

1

In outlining the convictions for the court, defense counsel
neglected to delineate that the 1978 conviction was for a burglary,
however his word choice and the sequence suggests that it was a
burglary and the "RAP" sheet in the record clarifies that the 1978
conviction was for burglary (R45-6). Furthermore, the court
recognized that the prior convictions involved two burglaries (R242).
- 4 -

In 1983, this Court adopted new rules of evidence, including
Rule 609 which is at issue in this case. The new rules were
patterned after the federal rules of evidence and became effective
in Utah courts on September 1, 1983. The committee promulgating the
new rules stated that the purpose was to seek uniformity between the
federal and Utah rules of evidence.

Boyce, Utah Rules of Evidence,

1983, 85 Utah L. Rev. 64. This Court agreed, stating that the
adoption of the rules indicated a "fresh start1' to the law of
evidence in Utah.

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986).

This

Court further instructed that the new rules were to be guided by
federal case law and supplant all inconsistent rules and statutes.
Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334 n.40.
Rule 609(a) is a verbatim replica of its federal counterpart
and speaks directly to the issue of impeachment by prior
convictions.

The Rule states:

Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of
crime, (a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law
which he was convicted, and the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
Subsection (2) of Rule 609(a) allows the admission of any prior
conviction, regardless of the punishment, if the crime involves

2

In State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987), this Court
held prospectively that a defendant must testify to preserve his
claim under Rule 609 for appeal.
- 5 -

dishonesty or false statement.

However, subsection (1) of the rule

allows the admission of felony convictions only after the court
performs a balancing test of the probative value of the evidence as
against its prejudicial effect to the accused.
This Court has not issued an opinion on the definition of
"crimes of dishonesty or false statement" since adopting the current
rules of evidence.3

However, ample federal case law exists for

guidance on the proper interpretation of "dishonesty" and false
statement.4
In United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
which this Court cited favorably in State v. Banner, the circuit
court discussed in detail the legislative history of Rule 609(a)
pointing out the heated debate which spawned the formulation of the
rule.

The Smith Court quoted the Conference Committee Report which

stated:
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" the
Conference means crimes such as perjury or
subornation of perjury, false pretense, or any
fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other

3

In State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), the Court
issued a per curiam opinion concluding that theft impliedly involves
dishonesty. However, Cintron was decided under the old rules of
evidence, Rule 21, and that position is contrary to the current
direction and fresh start of the new rules. Moreover, Cintron is
unsupported and remains inconsistent with the purpose of the current
rules as well as case precedents. In State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at
1334 n.40, this Court indicated that to the extent previous opinions
are inconsistent with the new direction taken by the Utah Rules of
Evidence, they should be overruled. Cintron is old law and should
play no role in the decision now before this Court.
4

This issue is currently before the Court in State v. Bruce,
Case No. 860325 (argued February 8, 1988).
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offense in the nature of crimen falsi/ the
commission of which involves some element of deceit,
untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the
accused's propensity to testify truthfully.
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d at 362 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News, pp. 7098, 7103).

Footnote 26 of the Smith opinion

discussed in detail the history of crimen falsi concluding that
crimes such as burglary and robbery would not qualify under the
crimen falsi designation.

Id. at 362-63.

Another opinion from the same circuit gave further light on
Congress' intent with regards to Rule 609(a)(2).

In a statement

from the court in United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir.
1976), which is also applicable to the prior burglary and robbery
convictions of Mr. Lanier, the court reasoned:
Although it may be argued that any wilful violation
of law . . . evinces a lack of character and a
disregard for all legal duties, including the
obligations of an oath, Congress has not accepted
that expansive theory.
535 F.2d at 123. The intent of Congress was to limit the
introduction of prior convictions for impeachment purposes only to
those crimes which bear directly on a witness' propensity to not
tell the truth.

Otherwise, one could argue, as discounted in

Millings, that any crime could be introduced to impeach.

As the

Millings court unequivocally stated, Congress simply did not intend
to adopt such an expansive position.

The prior convictions of

Mr. Lanier do not bear on his propensity to tell or not tell the
truth; they show no deceit or dishonesty as meant by Congress.

- 7 -

In United States v. Glenn, 667 P.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982), the
court held that the crimes of burglary and grand theft were not
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) without a showing of accompanying
fraudulent or deceitful conduct.
make such a showing.

The burden rests with the State to

The court observed that crimes of violence,

theft crimes, and crimes of stealth generally do not involve
"dishonesty or false statement" within the proper meaning of Rule
609(a)(2).
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that a prior conviction for
felony theft could not be used for impeachment purposes under Rule
609(a)(2) because a prior theft does not bear upon a witness's
propensity to testify truthfully.

The court stated that felony

theft does not involve "dishonesty or false statement" of the
credibility-deteriorating quality contemplated by Rule 609(a)(2).
Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981).
The only Utah opinion discussing whether theft, burglary or
robbery are crimes of dishonesty or false statement within the
meaning of Rule 609(a)(2) is Judge Jackson's dissenting opinion in
State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 n.2 (Utah App. 1988) (Jackson,
J. dissenting).

While the majority in Morehouse does not address

the Rule 609(a)(2) issue, the dissent in footnote 2, adopts the
above described line of cases and remains the only authoritative
discussion of the (a)(2) question by a Utah Court.
Because Mr. Lanier's convictions for burglary and robbery were
not crimes of dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2),
the trial court erred in admitting them under that subsection.5

- 8 -

The trial court also ruled erroneously that Mr, Lanier's
convictions were admissible under subsection 1 of Rule 609(a).

In

State v. Banner, this Court outlined the "[f]actors to be considered
when balancing probative value against prejudicial effect pursuant
to rule 609(a)(1)."

Id. at 1334. Those factors are:

[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on the
character for veracity of the witness.
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the prior
conviction . . .
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to the
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance may
lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad person.
[4] the importance of credibility issues in
determining the truth in a prosecution tried without
decisive nontestimonial evidence . . .
[5] the importance of the accused's testimony, as
perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions
probative of the accused's character for
veracity . . . "
Id.
This Court pointed out that the State has the "burden of
persuading the court that the probative value of admitting
convictions, as far as shedding light on the defendant's
credibility, outweighs the prejudicial effect on the defendant."
Id.

In Banner, this Court held that the trial judge committed

reversible error in denying Mr. Banner's motion to suppress
convictions for assault with intent to commit rape.
In State v. Gentry, this Court applied the factors set forth
in Banner and held that the court committed reversible error in
5 Even if the crimes involved dishonesty or false statement
under Rule 609(a)(2), the trial court should have suppressed the
convictions pursuant to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). As
set forth infra at 11-12, this Court has acknowledged the
significant prejudicial effect of prior similar crimes.
- 9 -

denying the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress convictions for
rape and escape.
In the instant case, the prosecutor "offered no evidence that
introduction of the convictions was more probative then
prejudicial."

Id. at 1334.6

Instead, the prosecutor argued

primarily that the convictions were admissible under 609(a)(2)
(R236-8).

The prosecutor then briefly expanded his argument,

stating:
Expand just briefly. I didn't get finished with
what we were talking about. What this whole section
deals with on conviction of crime, at least in No.
1, in the balancing portion is that someone who
commits a crime is more likely to have committed a
crime in the past and is more likely than not that
he has not committed a crime if they're willing to
break society's rules and commit crimes.
And we talk about serious crimes, felony crimes,
punishable by death or imprisonment and being in
excess of one year. And they are more likely in
other circumstances, including a trial, to not tell
the truth, and to break society's rules. And that's
the—
(R239-40)
The prosecutor's argument comes dangerously close to an
argument that because Mr. Lanier committed a crime in the past, he
acted in conformity with that behavior in committing the crime
charged.

Arguing that because an individual committed any crime he

is more likely to not tell the truth or otherwise break society
rule's does not sustain the burden of establishing that the prior

6

This is identical to the situation in Banner where the
prosecutor offered no such evidence. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at
1324.
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robbery and burglaries in the instant case are more probative than
prejudicial.
Applying the five factors set forth in Banner and Gentry,
first, a burglary or robbery has no bearing on the character for
veracity other than the general argument put forth by the prosecutor
that an individual who has committed a crime is more likely to not
tell the truth.

There is no element of deceit or fraud in these

crimes and hence, the nature of the crime does not weigh in favor of
admission.
Second, the burglary convictions were in 1977 and 1978, eight
and nine years before the trial in the present case.
of those convictions weighs in favor of exclusion.

The remoteness

The robbery

conviction was five years prior to trial, not particularly recent
nor remote and therefore not adding weight to the State's argument
for admission.
Third, the robbery is a conviction for a crime identical to
the one charged.

This weighs in favor of exclusion of the robbery

conviction since the "close resemblance may lead the jury to punish
the accused as a bad person" Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334.

Burglaries

are generally thought of as theft related and the term burglary is
often confused by lay persons with the term "robbery".
In both Banner and Gentry, this Court acknowledged that the
similarity between the prior conviction and the crime charged is a
significant factor weighing in favor of exclusion since such
similarity is "highly likely to prejudice jurors and unduly
influence their conclusion concerning defendant's guilt."
747 P.2d at 1037.

Gentry,

In State v. Banner, this Court acknowledged that where the
prior convictions are similar to those charged, the probative value
of such convictions will rarely outweigh the prejudicial effect.
Banner at 1334, n.44.

In Banner, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated:

Consideration of the testimony's prejudicial effect
is especially pertinent when the witness is the
defendant in a criminal prosecution . . . this is
particularly important when, as here, the prior
conviction is for the same type of crime involved in
the matter under present consideration. In this
type of situation, the probative value of the
evidence as affecting the party's credibility will
rarely outweigh the resulting confusion of the
issues in dispute and the prejudice to the party.
Banner at 1334 n.44 (emphasis altered) (quoting Terry v. Z.C.M.I.,
605 P.2d 314, 325 (Utah 1979)).

The similarity between burglary and

the crime of robbery charged in the instant case weighs strongly
against admission of the burglaries.
Finally, credibility issues were important to this case as was
the testimony of Mr. Lanier.

Mr. Lanier filed a "Notice of Intent

to Rely on the Defense of Alibi" on May 1, 1987 (R63).

Had

Mr. Lanier testified, he would have been able to outline his
whereabouts at the time the incident occurred.

Furthermore, since

the defense Mr. Lanier presented was based on faulty eyewitness
identification, his credibility and his testimony were essential.
All of the factors regarding both the burglary convictions and
the robbery conviction are either neutral or weigh against admission
of the three prior convictions.

Since none of the factors support a

finding that the probative value of the convictions outweighed their
prejudicial effect, the trial court erred in finding the convictions
admissible under Rule 609(a)(1).

The trial court's error in denying Mr. Lanier's motion to
suppress his prior convictions resulted in prejudice requiring
reversal of the conviction in the present case.
The appropriate standard for review is whether "there was 'a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant'."
omitted).

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d. at 1038 (citations

In Gentry, this court determined that there was "a

reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different had
defendant's prior convictions been excluded and had defendant taken
the stand."

Id.

The Court pointed out that had Gentry testified,

he might have convinced the jury that the testimony of one of the
witnesses was not true.
In the instant case, the same reasoning is applicable.

Had

Mr. Lanier testified he might have convinced the jurors that
Mr. Martinez made an error in identification and that the
codefendant in the case implicated him for her own benefit.7
Furthermore, in Banner, this Court focused on the withdrawal of a
notice of alibi along with the rest of the record in finding the
error reversible.

Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334.

In the present case,

had Mr. Lanier testified, he would have been able to present his
alibi defense that he was "in or enroute to Pensacola, Florida"
(R63) at the time the incident occurred.
When the trial court erroneously admitted the prior
convictions, Mr. Lanier was prejudiced and felt he could not then

7

Mr. Lanier also could have shown the jury the 2" by 1"
tattoo on his left hand. Mr. Martinez testified that he viewed both
hands of the robber, and did not see any tattoos or marks on the
left hand (R205).

take the stand.

Accordingly, this Court should find reversible

error and remand this case for a new trial with the prior
convictions excluded,

CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant,
James Devon Lanier, respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand the case to the District Court for a new
trial,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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